

**In Re: CHARA L. ALLEN**  
**Bar No.: 7489**  
**Case No.: OBC 16-1032**  
**Filed: June 13, 2017**

## LETTER OF REPRIMAND

Dear Ms. Allen:

On November 18, 2015, Ranya Thompson (“Thompson”) retained you to file a complaint for custody of her infant child. Thompson paid you an initial retainer of \$3,000. You negotiated the retainer without depositing it into an IOLTA Trust Account as required by Supreme Court Rule (“SCR”) 78.5 and Rule of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) 1.15.

Thompson executed your Retainer Agreement, which stated that Thompson would be billed for your time expended on her matter, and that you would “generally forward to client monthly statements...”. During the course of your representation of Thompson, you did not provide Thompson with billing statements.

You prepared a Complaint in or about December 2015, and entrusted a process service to file and serve the Complaint. You then assumed, but did not verify by review of court records or otherwise, that the Complaint had been filed. Further, the process service was not responsive to your efforts to confirm filing and service of the complaint.

Between November 2015 and May 2016, Thompson repeatedly contacted you to determine the status of her case and the status of service of the Complaint. You did not advise Thompson that the complaint had not been filed. Instead you advised Thompson that efforts were being made to locate and serve the child’s father in spite of the fact you had been unable to communicate with the process service.

The complaint for Child Custody was not filed by you until June 6, 2016. On July 14, 2016, Thompson terminated your representation and hired a new attorney. Thompson requested that you provide a Substitution of Attorney to her new attorney, and provide Thompson with an itemized bill, a copy of Thompson’s file, and a refund of Thompson’s unexpended retainer money. You provided the Substitution of Attorney and a copy of the July 7, 2016, Affidavit of Service of the Complaint, but did not provide the file, the requested billing statement, or a refund of unexpended retainer.

Based upon the foregoing, you are hereby REPRIMANDED for your conduct related to representation of Thompson, which conduct violated Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) as follows: RPC 1.3 (Diligence) for failing to diligently file and serve the complaint for Child Custody, which you had been retained by Thompson to file; RPC 1.15 (Safekeeping Property) for failing to deposit Thompson’s \$3,000 retainer into an IOLTA trust account for the benefit of her representation, and failing to promptly refund unearned fees when they were requested by Thompson.

Thompson was harmed as a consequence of your lack of diligence and failure to safekeep her retainer funds because she was deprived of prompt resolution of a child custody conflict, and was forced to retain alternate counsel eight months after your retention, all without the benefit of the funds provided to you to obtain legal services.

Finally, in accordance with Nevada Supreme Court Rule 120 you are assessed costs in the amount of \$1,500, plus the actual costs of this disciplinary proceeding to be documented by the State Bar in a Memorandum of Costs to be served on you within 30 days of the date of this Letter of Reprimand.

**In Re: ALFONSO E. GARCIA**  
**Bar No.: 4994**  
**Case No.: OBC16-1172**  
**Filed: June 26, 2017**

## PUBLIC REPRIMAND

Dear Mr. Garcia,

Ricardo Matos-Duran (“Matos-Duran”), Lazaro Arbolaes (“Arbolaes”), and Daislan Revolva (Revolva) were rear-ended in a car accident and retained you in January 2013 on a contingency basis to represent them.

On January 2, 2015, you filed a Complaint in Eighth District Court of Clark County Case No. A-15-711802-C on behalf of Matos-Duran, Arbolaes, and Revolva. However, you failed to follow-up on the unsuccessful service of the Complaint and Summons, which caused the case to be dismissed and administratively closed on June 8, 2015. On June 8, 2015, a copy of the Dismissal Order was electronically served and/or placed in the attorney’s folders maintained by the Clerk of the Court as follows.

On or about September 14, 2016, Matos-Duran and Arbolaes informed you that they had retained new counsel. On or about September 23, 2016, Matos-Duran and Arbolaes filed a grievance with the State Bar regarding your handling of their case. After the State Bar requested information relating to this grievance from you, you stated that you filed the court action to preserve the clients’ rights while continuing to negotiate their case, but that you had experienced some personal issues, including becoming both of your parents’ primary caregivers and the passing of your father after a prolonged illness and hospice care, which contributed to the lack of follow-up on the service of process in this case.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize your duty to be diligent and to expedite litigation. As such, you violated Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 (Diligence) and Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2 (Expediting Litigation). You are hereby PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED for your actions.

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## In Re: AILEEN MERRILL SCHLISSSEL

Bar No.: 10981

Case No.: 71843

Filed: September 11, 2017

### ORDER APPROVING CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT

*Attorney suspended for four years, following guilty plea which included admissions of violations of RPC 1.3 (diligence), RPC 1.4 (communication), RPC 1.5 (fees), RPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), RPC 5.3 (responsibilities regarding non-lawyer assistants), RPC 5.4 (professional independence of a lawyer), RPC 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law), RPC 7.1 (communications concerning a lawyer's services), RPC 7.2 (advertising), RPC 7.2A (advertising filing requirements), and RPC 8.4 (misconduct).*

This is an automatic review of a Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board hearing panel's recommendation that this court approve, pursuant to SCR 113, a conditional guilty plea agreement in exchange for a stated form of discipline for attorney Aileen Merrill Schlissel. Under the agreement, Schlissel admitted to violating RPC 1.3 (diligence), RPC 1.4 (communication), RPC 1.5 (fees), RPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), RPC 5.3 (responsibilities regarding non-lawyer assistants), RPC 5.4 (professional independence of a lawyer), RPC 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law), RPC 7.1 (communications concerning a lawyer's services), RPC 7.2 (advertising), RPC 7.2A (advertising filing requirements), and RPC 8.4 (misconduct). The agreement provides for a four-year suspension, the payment of \$34,233.25 in restitution, and the placement of \$20,000 in trust in the event additional victims are identified.

Schlissel has admitted to the facts and violations alleged in the complaint. The record therefore establishes that Schlissel opened and operated two separate national law firms to assist clients with loan modifications. She maintained a Nevada trust account and a virtual office in Nevada, but her physical office was located in California. She mailed advertisements concerning her law firms nationwide but failed to file those advertisements with the Nevada State Bar. She employed non-attorney "recruiters" who were compensated based on the number of people they were able to sign up for loan modification services and some of those recruiters told potential clients to stop paying their mortgages and use their mortgage payment to pay the firm's fees. Those recruiters often made false promises regarding how long the modification process would take and what the client's monthly mortgage payment or interest rate would be at the end of the process. Some of those recruiters also contacted clients directly before the clients ever reached out to either law firm. Further, some clients never spoke to an attorney throughout the entire loan modification process and only dealt with non-attorney staff members. Lastly, Schlissel used unearned client funds that she was holding in trust to pay payroll and overhead costs.

In determining the appropriate discipline, we weigh four factors: "the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors." *In re Discipline of Lerner*, 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2008).

Schlissel violated duties owed to her clients (diligence, communication, fees, safekeeping property, and communications concerning a lawyer's services) and the profession (responsibilities regarding non-lawyer assistants,

professional independence of a lawyer, unauthorized practice of law, advertising, and advertising filing requirements). Schlissel admitted that her misconduct was intentional.

Schlissel's clients were harmed because they did not receive the loan modifications that were promised to them, they paid fees for services they did not receive, and they were provided legal advice from non-attorneys. The profession was harmed because Schlissel's unapproved advertising, unauthorized practice of law, and failure to properly supervise non-lawyer assistants was detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar. The panel found three aggravating circumstances (pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and vulnerability of victim) and three mitigating circumstances (absence of prior disciplinary record, personal or emotional problems, and cooperative attitude toward proceedings). SCR 102.5.

Based on the most serious instance of misconduct at issue, see Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards 452 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2015) ("The ultimate sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct among a number of violations."), the baseline sanction before considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances is disbarment because Schlissel has admitted that her misconduct was intentional, see *id.* Standard 7.1 ("Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system."). In light of the mitigating circumstances, however, we conclude that the agreed-upon four-year suspension, instead of disbarment, is appropriate. The duration of the suspension along with the payment of restitution are sufficient to serve the purpose of attorney discipline - to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession, not to punish the attorney. *State Bar of Nev. v. Claiborne*, 104 Nev. 115, 213, 756 P.2d 464, 527-28 (1988). Thus, we conclude that the guilty plea agreement should be approved. See SCR 113(1).

Accordingly, we hereby suspend attorney Aileen Merrill Schlissel from the practice of law in Nevada for a period of four years commencing from the date of this order (We note that Schlissel has been administratively suspended pursuant to SCR 212 since December 27, 2016. *In re: Application of CLE Board*, Docket No. 70519 (Order, December 27, 2016). Schlissel shall pay \$34,233.25 in restitution and place another \$20,000 in trust in the event that additional victims not accounted for in the calculated restitution come forward with valid claims for restitution. Schlissel shall also pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings, plus fees in the amount of \$2,500, within 30 days of the date of this order if she has not done so already. SCR 120. The parties shall comply with SCR 115 and SCR 121.1.

## In Re: ROBERT C. GRAHAM

Bar No.: 4618

Case No.: 72693

Filed: September 11, 2017

### ORDER OF DISBARMENT

*Attorney disbarred following violations of RPC 1.3 (diligence), RPC 1.4 (communication), RPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), RPC 1.16 (declining or terminating representation), RPC 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), RPC 4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others), and RPC 8.4 (misconduct).*

This is an automatic review of a Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board hearing panel's recommendation that attorney Robert C. Graham be disbarred based on violations of RPC 1.3 (diligence), RPC 1.4 (communication), RPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), RPC 1.16 (declining or terminating representation), RPC 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), RPC 4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others), and RPC 8.4 (misconduct). Because no briefs have been filed, this matter stands submitted for decision based on the record. SCR 105(3)(b).

The State Bar has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that Graham committed the violations charged. *In re Discipline of Drakulich*, 111 Nev. 1556, 1566, 908 P.2d 709, 715 (1995).

Here, however, the facts and charges alleged in the complaint are deemed admitted because Graham failed to answer the complaint and a default was entered (Despite failing to answer the complaint, Graham was represented by counsel at the disciplinary hearing), 1 SCR 105(2). The record therefore establishes that Graham violated the above referenced rules by misappropriating approximately \$17 million in client funds, failing to diligently disburse funds owed to clients, failing to respond to clients' requests for information regarding their funds, lying to the court and others regarding the location and status of client funds, and abandoning his law practice.

Turning to the appropriate discipline, we review the hearing panel's recommendation de novo. SCR 105(3)(b). Although we "must... exercise independent judgment," the panel's recommendation is persuasive. *In re Discipline of Schaefer*, 117 Nev. 496, 515, 25 P.3d 191, 204 (2001). In determining the appropriate discipline, we weigh four factors: "the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." *In re Discipline of Lerner*, 12~ Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2008).

Graham violated duties owed to his clients (diligence, communication, safekeeping property, terminating representation), to the public (truthfulness in statements to others), and to the legal system (candor toward the tribunal). Graham's conduct was intentional and it caused substantial, even overwhelming, harm because his clients, many of whom are vulnerable victims, lost substantial amounts of their assets. The baseline sanction for his misconduct, before consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is disbarment. See Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards, Standard 4.II (Am. Bar Ass'n 2015) ("Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client."); *id.*, Standard 4.41 (indicating that disbarment is generally appropriate when "a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client" or "knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, or "engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client").

The hearing panel found only one mitigating circumstance: no prior disciplinary record, SCR 102.5(2). We agree with the hearing panel that this single mitigating circumstance does not warrant discipline less than

disbarment, particularly considering the numerous aggravating circumstances found by the panel (dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct, vulnerability of victims, substantial experience in the law, indifference to making restitution, and illegal conduct, SCR 102.5(1)). Because the amount of misappropriated client funds is staggering and Graham exploited vulnerable people, disbarment is the only appropriate discipline.

Accordingly, we disbar attorney Robert C. Graham from the practice of law in Nevada. Such disbarment is irrevocable. SCR 102(1). Graham shall pay restitution as set forth by the State Bar in the amount of \$17,208,152.78. He shall also pay a fine of \$1 million to the Nevada Client [sic] Security Fund. Further, Graham shall pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings, including \$3,000 under SCR 120, within 30 days of the date of this order. The parties shall comply with SCR 115 and SCR 121.1.

**In Re: ROBERT H. DOMICO**  
**Bar No.: 6272**  
**Case No.: 71842**  
**Filed: September 11, 2017**

## ORDER APPROVING CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT

*Attorney suspended six months, following admissions of violating RPC 1.8 (conflict of interest: current clients: specific rules).*

This is an automatic review of a Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board hearing panel's recommendation that this court approve, pursuant to SCR 113, a conditional guilty plea agreement in exchange for a stated form of discipline for attorney Robert H. Domico. Under the agreement, Domico admitted to violating RPC 1.8 (conflict of interest: current clients: specific rules). The agreement provides for a six-month suspension stayed subject to the condition that Domico have no further discipline resulting in a letter of reprimand or greater during the next two years.

Domico has admitted to the facts and violation alleged in the complaint. The record therefore establishes that Domico violated RPC 1.8 by representing a client while also serving as the client's real estate agent without obtaining a written waiver of conflict or advising his client of the desirability of seeking independent counsel for the real estate transaction.

In determining the appropriate discipline, we weigh four factors: "the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors." *In re Discipline of Lerner*, 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2008). Domico violated a duty owed to his client (conflict of interest), and the admitted violation reflects knowing or intentional misconduct. The client was potentially harmed because

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he believed that Domico would assist him with re-establishing his contractor's license and LLC in exchange for the client not informing Domico's law firm that Domico was listing real property for sale on behalf of the client and then the client's property was sold at a sheriff's sale, after it was removed from the market, to cover unpaid legal fees owed to Domico's law firm. There are three aggravating circumstances (dishonest or selfish motive, vulnerability of victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law) and three mitigating circumstances (absence of a prior disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to disciplinary authority or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and character and reputation). SCR 102.5.

The baseline sanction before considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances is suspension. See Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards, Standard 4.32 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2015). (providing that suspension is appropriate when a lawyer "knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client"). Considering the duty violated, the potential injury to Domico's client, and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we conclude that the guilty plea agreement should be approved. See SCR 113(1).

Accordingly, we hereby suspend attorney Robert H. Domico from the practice of law in Nevada for a period of six months. The suspension shall be stayed and Domico shall be on probation for two years from the date of this order with the following condition: Domico shall have no discipline resulting in a letter of reprimand or greater during the probationary period. Additionally, Domico shall be publicly reprimanded, as proposed by the State Bar. Domico shall also pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings, plus fees in the amount of \$2,500, within 30 days of the date of this order if he has not done so already. SCR 120. The State Bar shall comply with SCR 121.1.

### In Re: DUSTIN L. DINGMAN

Bar No.: 7678

Case No.: 72370

Filed: September 11, 2017

## ORDER APPROVING CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT

*Attorney suspended six months and one day following admissions to violations of RPC 1.15(a) (safekeeping property in trust account), RPC 1.15(b) (commingling funds), RPC 1.15(d) (notice and delivery of funds), and RPC 1.15(e) (holding disputed property).*

This is an automatic review of a Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board hearing panel's recommendation that this court approve, pursuant to SCR 113, a conditional guilty plea agreement in exchange for a stated form of discipline for attorney Dustin L. Dingman.

Under the agreement, Dingman admitted to violations of RPC 1.15(a) (safekeeping property in trust account), RPC

1.15(b) (commingling funds), RPC 1.15(d) (notice and delivery of funds), and RPC 1.15(e) (holding disputed property). The agreement provides for a six-month-and-one-day suspension, the payment of \$38,015.49 in restitution, payment of the costs of the disciplinary proceedings, and completion of 15 Continuing Legal Education (CLE) credits in the area of law-office management.

The State Bar has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that Dingman committed the violations charged. *In re Discipline of Drakulich*, 111 Nev. 1556, 1566, 908 P.2d 709, 715 (1995). Here, however, Dingman has admitted to the facts and violations alleged in the complaint. The record therefore establishes that Dingman violated the above-referenced rules by misappropriating client funds from his trust account.

In determining the appropriate discipline, we weigh four factors: "the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors." *In re Discipline of Lerner*, 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2008). Dingman admitted violating duties owed to his clients (safekeeping property), but the admitted violations reflect negligent misconduct as the misappropriation of funds was a result of Dingman's assistant failing to pay out client settlement funds. Dingman's clients were harmed because they have not received funds owed to them. There are two aggravating circumstances (multiple offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law) and five mitigating circumstances (absence of prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct, full and free disclosure to disciplinary authority or cooperative attitude toward proceeding, and remorse). SCR 102.5. Based on the most serious instance of misconduct at issue, see Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards 452 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2015) ("The ultimate sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct among a number of violations."), the baseline sanction before considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances is suspension, see *id.* Standard 4.42(b), Standard 4.12.

Considering the duties violated, the injury caused by Dingman's misconduct, and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we conclude that the guilty plea agreement should be approved. See SCR 113(1).

Accordingly, we hereby suspend attorney Dustin L. Dingman from the practice of law in Nevada for a period of six months and one day. Prior to applying for reinstatement, Dingman must pay restitution as provided in the plea agreement, attend in person and complete 15 CLE credits in law-office management and report those credits directly to the Office of Bar Counsel, and engage in no further conduct constituting a violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct. Dingman shall also pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings including \$2,500 pursuant to SCR 120, \$139.75 in bank record costs, \$3,216.25 in trust account audit costs, and the court reporter costs. The parties shall comply with SCR 115 and SCR 121.1.

**In Re: MICHELLE L. VALIER BOWMAN**  
**Bar No.: 11877**  
**Case No.: 71568**  
**Filed: September 11, 2017**

## ORDER OF DISBARMENT

*Attorney disbarred following violations of RPC 1.3 (diligence), RPC 1.4 (communication), RPC 1.5 (fees), RPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), RPC 1.16 (termination of representation), RPC 3.2 (expediting litigation), RPC 8.1(b) (bar admission and disciplinary matters), and RPC 8.4 (misconduct).*

This is an automatic review of a Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board hearing panel's recommendation that attorney Michelle L. Valier Bowman be disbarred based on violations of RPC 1.3 (diligence), RPC 1.4 (communication), RPC 1.5 (fees), RPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), RPC 1.16 (termination of representation), RPC 3.2 (expediting litigation), RPC 8.1(b) (bar admission and disciplinary matters), and RPC 8.4 (misconduct). Because no briefs have been filed, this matter stands submitted for decision based on the record. SCR 105(3)(b).

The State Bar has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that Bowman committed the violations charged. *In re Discipline of Drakulich*, 111 Nev. 1556, 1566, 908 P.2d 709, 715 (1995). Here, however, the facts and charges alleged in the complaint are deemed admitted because Bowman failed to answer the complaint and a default was entered. (During the investigation phase, after an initial responsive letter, Bowman failed to respond to the State Bar's numerous attempts to contact her via mail, email, and phone. The State Bar sent the bar complaint and a notice of intent to take a default to Bowman through regular and certified mail. The State Bar also informed Bowman via phone of the date and time for the hearing. The State Bar attempted to contact Bowman again telephonically a week before the hearing but was unable to get through. Bowman failed to appear at the hearing.) SCR 105(2). The record therefore establishes that Bowman violated the above-referenced rules by failing to diligently or expeditiously pursue actions on behalf of her client, taking over \$70,000 of her client's funds, abandoning her legal practice without informing her client that she was terminating her representation, and failing to cooperate with the bar investigation or proceeding.

Turning to the appropriate discipline, we review the hearing panel's recommendation de novo. SCR 105(3)(b). Although we "must... exercise independent judgment," the panel's recommendation is persuasive. *In re Discipline of Schaefer*, 117 Nev. 496, 515, 25 P.3d 191, 204 (2001). In determining the appropriate discipline we weigh four factors: "the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." *In re Discipline of Lerner*, 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2008).

Bowman violated duties owed to her client (diligence, communication, safekeeping property, terminating representation, and expediting litigation) and the profession (fees and failing to respond to lawful requests for information by a disciplinary authority). The conduct alleged in the complaint appears to have been knowing or intentional. Bowman's client suffered an actual injury because over \$10,000 of the funds it entrusted to Bowman is gone and because many of its cases were closed or dismissed. Bowman's failure to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation harmed the integrity of the profession, which depends on a self-regulating disciplinary system.

The baseline sanction for her misconduct, before consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is disbarment. See Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Rules and Standards, Standard 4.11 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2015) ("Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client."); *id.*, Standard 4.41 (indicating that disbarment is generally appropriate when "a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client" or "knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client" or "engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client").

The hearing panel found only one mitigating circumstance: no prior disciplinary record, SCR 102.5(2). We agree with the hearing panel that this single mitigating circumstance does not warrant discipline less than disbarment, particularly considering the numerous aggravating circumstances found by the panel (dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or order, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct, and indifference to making restitution, SCR 102.5(1)). (The panel also found the vulnerability of the victim as an aggravating circumstance, but the basis for that finding is unclear as Bowman's client was a corporation. Thus, the vulnerable victim aggravating factor did not affect our consideration of the recommended discipline.) While we are mindful that disbarment in Nevada is irrevocable, SCR 102(1), Bowman's egregious misconduct and her demonstrated indifference to the disciplinary proceedings indicate that disbarment is necessary in this instance to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession. See *State Bar of Nev. v. Claiborne*, 104 Nev. 115, 213, 756 P.2d 464, 527-28 (1988).

Accordingly, we disbar attorney Michelle L. Valier Bowman from the practice of law in Nevada. Such disbarment is irrevocable. SCR 102(1). Bowman shall pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings, including \$3,000 under SCR 120, within 30 days of the date of this order. The parties shall comply with SCR 115 and SCR 121.1.